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Many topics that scientists investigate speak to people’s ideological worldviews. We report three 
studies—including an analysis of large-scale survey data— in which we systematically 
investigate the ideological antecedents of general faith in science and willingness to support 
science, as well as of science skepticism of climate change, vaccination, and GM. The main 
predictors are religiosity and political orientation, morality, and science understanding. Overall, 
science understanding is associated with vaccine and GM food acceptance, but not climate 
change acceptance. Importantly, different ideological predictors are related to the acceptance of 
different scientific findings. Political conservatism best predicts climate change skepticism. 
Religiosity, alongside moral purity concerns, best predicts vaccination skepticism. GM food 
skepticism is not fueled by religious or political ideology. Finally, religious conservatives 
consistently display a low faith in science and an unwillingness to support science. Thus, science 
acceptance and rejection have different ideological roots, depending on the topic of investigation. 













Exploring the ideological antecedents of science acceptance and rejection 
Throughout history, the relationship between science and religion has been tense and 
contentious. At various times in history, for example when Galileo Galilei introduced his 
heliocentric model, or when Darwin introduced the theory of evolution by natural selection, 
science and religion seemed to be on a collision course. However, there have also been voices—
in religion as well as in science—that claim compatibilism (e.g., Gould, 1997; Sager, 2008). In 
modern times, science continues to spark controversy among the general public. As a testament 
to this, public attitudes toward science seem to once again have become more polarized. 
Although recent large-scale surveys conducted in North America and the UK suggest that 
scientists rank among the most respected professions—alongside doctors, nurses, firefighters, 
and military officers (Angus Reid, 2012; Harris Poll, 2014)—others point to an increased public 
distrust in science and a growing anti-science movement, particularly among conservatives (e.g., 
Gauchat, 2012; Nature editorial, 2017; Pittinsky, 2015). However, research examining this 
alleged link between political conservatism and the rejection of science has produced mixed 
findings. 
Of all the potentially contentious topics that scientists investigate, researchers interested 
in science skepticism have taken the most interest in the environmental and biomedical sciences, 
in particular the topics of climate change, childhood vaccination, and genetic modification (GM). 
For example, political conservatism and endorsement of free-market ideology reliably predict 
anthropogenic climate change skepticism (Lewandowky et al., 2013a; 2013b; 2015). Indeed, this 
link between political ideology and climate change skepticism was recently confirmed in a meta-
analysis (Hornsey, Harris, Bain, and Fielding, 2016). In contrast, conservatives (vs. liberals) 
were found not to be more prone to anti-vaccine attitudes1 nor to GM food skepticism (a similar 
observation was made by Scott, Inbar, & Rozin, 2016; see also Kahan, 2015). 
But what about religion? Given the tense history of the science-religion relationship, it is 
striking that relatively little empirical work has invested how modern rejection of science might 
be fueled by religiosity (McPhetres & Nguyen, 2017; Rutjens, Heine, Sutton, & van Harreveld, 
in press). Indeed, measures of religious belief and religious identity are—as far as we are 
aware—curiously absent (or, at best, religiosity is briefly mentioned as a demographic control 
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variable) in the bulk of the recent work on science skepticism. One notable exception is work 
showing that religiosity is negatively related to support for nanotechnology funding (Brossard et 
al., 2008). A compelling theoretical reason for why it is important to take religion into account is 
that science and religion both function as ultimate explanatory frameworks (or belief systems) 
that aim to provide answers to the big questions in life, and that the explanations provided by 
each framework can be at odds with each other (e.g., in the case of evolution by natural 
selection; Blancke et al., 2012; Thagard & Findlay, 2010). Indeed, not only can science provide 
support for explanations that are incompatible with religious doctrine (Blancke et al., 2012; 
Farias, 2013; McCauley, 2011; Preston & Epley, 2009), scientific understanding also routinely 
runs counter to various intuitions about how the world works. These intuitions result from 
evolved cognitive biases such as teleology and essentialism, and render already counterintuitive 
scientific theories even more difficult to understand and accept (cf. McCauley, 2011). 
Additionally, scientific and technological progress sometimes runs counter to deeply held 
religious beliefs and values, for example in the case of stem cell research, GM, and genome 
editing (Rutjens, van Harreveld, van der Pligt, van Elk, & Pyszczynski, 2016; see also Heine, 
Dar-Nimrod, Cheung, & Proulx, 2017). 
Religiosity and political ideology reliably intercorrelate; political conservatives are on 
average more religious than liberals (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Layman, 2001; Malka et 
al., 2012). This means that some of the previous work on science skepticism above may have 
confounded conservatism with religiosity, so that some but perhaps not all science skepticism 
might be fueled by religiosity rather than political ideology. Additionally, both political 
conservatives and religious believers place relatively strong emphasis on traditional—or 
binding—moral values, such as respect for authority, loyalty towards the ingroup, and the 
importance of maintaining the natural order of things (Graham et al., 2009; McKay & 
Whitehouse, 2014; Piazza & Sousa, 2014; Rutjens, et al., 2016). This brings us to another 
potential catalyst of science skepticism: Morality, in particular moral concerns about naturalness 
and purity.    
Indeed, one other reason why modern science elicits such ambivalent evaluations is that 
many fields of research involve topics that speak to people’s deeply held moral views about 
society and the world. Moralized attitudes (or moral convictions) have been shown to be 




refer to an absolute belief that something is right or wrong, and are therefore not negotiable, even 
in the light of new information or evidence. In other words, when members of the public read 
about research on—for example—evolution, nanotechnology, GM, vaccination, equality and 
fairness, drugs and health, or violence in video games, it is not surprising that their evaluations of 
the scientific evidence will at least partially be shaped by their preexisting moralized attitudes 
and ideologies (Blancke et al., 20012; Brossard et al., 2008; Diethelm & McKee, 2009; Douglas 
& Sutton, 2015; Hornsey et al., in press; Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberauer, 2013, 2015; Scott 
et al., 2016). The degree to which people take moral offense to science findings predicts their 
unwillingness to accept these findings (Colombo, Bucher, & Inbar, 2015), and disgust-based 
concerns about moral purity are a recurring theme (e.g., in the case of GM resistance; Scott et al., 
2016). As a consequence, moral convictions might interfere with factual interpretations of the 
scientific evidence that is presented, leading to increased skepticism and rejection.  
Finally, not only are some—or perhaps many—scientific and technological advances 
hard to reconcile with religious beliefs and values, ideology, and morality, but many of these 
advances are generally too complex to properly understand. Another reason for general science 
skepticism might therefore simply be a lack of knowledge among the public. Indeed, many 
people respect and distrust science and scientists at the same time (e.g., Fiske & Dupree, 2014; 
Rutjens & Heine, 2016). One observation that speaks to this ambivalence is that the beliefs and 
attitudes about (the safety of) science and technology held by the general public differ from those 
held by scientists. As a striking example of this discrepancy, a recent Pew survey reported that 
88% of the surveyed scientists (versus 37% of the public) viewed the consumption of GM foods 
as safe (Pew Research Center, 2015; see also Blancke, Van Breusegem, De Jaeger, Braeckman, 
& Van Montagu, 2015). This difference in safety perceptions is arguably caused by differences 
in knowledge; scientists trust science more than the general public does because they rely on 
different, more accurate, knowledge about—in this case—GM.  
Taking all of the above into account, we can identify four predictors of science 
acceptance and rejection: Religiosity, political ideology, morality, and knowledge about science 
(i.e., literacy). However, most of these variables intercorrelate and are therefore potentially 
confounded. When not measuring all constructs simultaneously, it will be hard to properly assess 
what the predictive value of each of these is. As an example, if one line of research finds that 




included, we cannot be sure what the actual ideological predictor (e.g., religious identity) or 
combination of predictors (e.g., politically conservative, but not liberal, self-identified religious 
believers) is. Likewise, when another line of research finds that concerns about moral purity lead 
to science rejection this might well reflect underlying effects of political conservatism, or 
perhaps religious orthodoxy. In a similar vein, a certain level of particular knowledge about 
science and technology might be confounded with low religious belief or even with political 
liberalism. Also, one specific ideological motivator of science skepticism may be unique to one 
particular topic, as seems to be the case with political conservatism, which reliably predicts 
climate change skepticism but not GM food skepticism.      
 In short, a systematic investigation of the relative role of religious belief and political 
ideology—alongside morality and scientific literacy—in predicting belief in science and science 
skepticism is lacking, and the primary goal of the current research was to address this gap. We 
set out to scrutinize religious belief and identity, political ideology, and moral concerns as 
predictors of science acceptance and rejection, across different topics and using various measures 
(and including a scientific literacy test in the pilot study and Study 3). Since these predictors are 
correlated and therefore potentially confounded, our goal in the current research was to gauge 
their relative predictive value for general belief in science, willingness to support science, and 
science skepticism in the fields of environmental science (climate change) and biomedical 
science (childhood vaccination and GM foods)—currently among science’s most controversial 
topics.          
Overview of current research 
We report the results of three online studies, conducted on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk2 (MTurk; 
total N = 445), and an analysis using existing data from the International Survey Program 2010 
(ISSP Research Group, 2012; N = 1430), that aimed to shed more light on the relative weight of 
the ideological antecedents of belief in science and science skepticism. An a-priori power 
analysis for hierarchical multiple regression in which we set an average effect size of f2 = .15, 
power = .80, alpha = .05 (number of predictors set to 12) yielded a recommended sample size of 
103. We deliberately oversampled in Studies 1 and 3. Table 1 provides an overview of the key 
variables and Figure 1 provides an overview of the key findings. 
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In a pilot study, we included often employed measures of science rejection (i.e., climate 
change and childhood vaccination skepticism3; Lewandowsky et al., 2013a, 2013b), a scientific 
literacy test (Hayes & Tariq, 2000; Kahan et al., 2012), and measures of political orientation and 
religious belief. In Study 1, we replaced the scientific literacy test with a measure of faith in 
science (Farias et al., 2013), added more fine-grained measures of political orientation and 
religious belief (i.e., religious orthodoxy), and included a measure gauging moral concerns (the 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). Moreover, we devised a 
behavioral measure of science support. Here, participants were presented with a resource 
allocation task in which they could rearrange a ‘discretionary spending pie’, which included 
science (alongside military, transportation, and a number of other domains). This measure 
allowed participants to prioritize science by allocating federal funding to it. Study 2 aimed to 
conceptually replicate the results of Study 1 among a more general-population sample by 
performing secondary analyses on relevant variables from the ISSP 2010 – Environment III 
dataset (ISSP Research Group, 2012). This preexisting dataset did not include a measure of 
vaccine skepticism, but did include a measure of GM food skepticism. Study 3 replicated and 
extended Studies 1 and 2, by including both a scientific literacy test and a faith in science 
measure, and more elaborate measures of climate change, childhood vaccination, and GM food 
skepticism (Lewandowsky, 2013b). In all studies, we provide zero-order correlations and the 
results of hierarchical regression analyses on science skepticism, faith in science (Studies 1-3), 
and science support (Studies 1 and 3).  
Pilot Study 
Method 
 Participants (105 MTurk workers, 42 women; Mage = 30.19, SD = 8.73) were first asked 
to respond to four science rejection items (Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013a; 
Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberauer, 2013b). Two items reflected medical facts: ‘The HIV virus 
causes AIDS’ and ‘Smoking causes lung cancer’. The other two items were more contentious: 
‘Human CO2 emissions cause climate change’ and ‘Vaccinations cause autism’. All items were 
scored on 7-point scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The first three 
items were reverse-scored. Participants then completed a scientific literacy test (9 true-false 
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items, a maximum score of 9; Į 4; Hayes & Tarick, 2000; Kahan et al., 2012; see Appendix 
A)5. After completing an attention check (Oppenheimer et al., 2012), participants indicated their 
gender, age, nationality, occupation, religious identity (“Do you consider yourself to be a 
religious person?”), religious affiliation (i.e., denomination), belief in God (100-point slider scale 
ranging from not at all to very much), and political conservatism (100-point slider scale ranging 
from very liberal to very conservative).   
Results and discussion 
 We used hierarchical regression analysis to assess which variables best predict science 
rejection. Controlling for age, gender, and profession, we entered political conservatism in 
Model 1, religiosity in Model 2, and scientific literacy in Model 3. For an overview of the means 
(SD), correlations, and regression tables, please see Appendix B. The results yielded a number of 
initial insights. Although all four science rejection items were statistically related to scientific 
literacy, they differed in important ways in terms of how well they were predicted by religious 
and political ideology. The publically accepted medical facts that HIV causes AIDS and smoking 
causes lung cancer were not ideologically fueled. Rejection of anthropogenic climate change was 
best predicted by political conservatism (and scientific literacy), but not by religion (Model 3 
explained 20% of the variance, F(6, 97) = 4.67, p < .001). In contrast, vaccine skepticism was 
clearly grounded in religious belief. Scientific literacy however was the strongest predictor of 
vaccine skepticism, which together with religiosity accounted for 47% of the explained variance, 
F(6, 97) = 14.08, p < .001. Political conservatism was a weaker predictor6 of vaccine skepticism. 
This suggests that these two prominent forms of science rejection have different ideological 
antecedents. 
Study 1 
In Study 1, our aim was to build on the pilot study results and test the ideological 
antecedents of science acceptance and rejection with a larger sample and adding several 
important variables. First, we included a measure of faith in science (Farias et al., 2013), which 
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 Participants also completed two stereotypes about scientists’ measures: An intuitive moral stereotype measure (i.e., 
conjunction fallacy measure) and an explicit measure designed to tap into moral stereotypes of scientists (e.g., “A 
scientist prefers knowledge acquisition over preventing harm”; Į = .62; Rutjens & Heine, 2016). 
6




rather than focusing on skepticism about specific science findings taps into a more general belief 
in science and acceptance of the scientific method. Given that science and religion are perceived 
by many as competing ultimate explanations (e.g., Blancke et al., 2012; Farias, 2013; Preston & 
Epley, 2008), we expected that general faith in science would be best predicted by religious 
rather than political ideology. Furthermore, we expected to replicate the findings of the pilot 
study: Political conservatism best predicts climate change skepticism and religiosity best predicts 
vaccine skepticism (note that scientific literacy was not measured in Study 17).   
Second, we included the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 
2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007; see also Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999; Scott et al., 2016) 
in order to assess if—and to what extent—concerns about what is morally right and wrong 
underlies the rejection of science. Conservatives as well as highly religious individuals tend to 
emphasize traditional moral values (i.e., binding moral foundations), especially those that pertain 
to purity (Graham et al., 2009; Piazza & Sousa, 2014). Moreover, life sciences and their 
application, such as vaccination and GM, have been shown to flout purity concerns (e.g., Scott et 
al., 2016) and that scientists have been shown to be associated in people’s minds with immoral 
conduct, especially pertaining to impurity (Rutjens & Heine, 2016; see also Fiske & Dupree, 
2014). It remains to be seen however whether moral concerns about purity can help predict 
science rejection when competing for explained variance with political and religious ideology.      
Third, we included a measure of religious orthodoxy in order to tap into religious 
conservatism (next to the religious identity and belief in God measures). Arguably, the 
incompatibility of science and religion should be particularly strong for the religious orthodox 
because orthodoxy implies viewing religion as the main source of truth (Clobert & Saroglou, 
2014; Dawkins, 2006; Evans, 2011; Jensen, 1998; Jensen, 2009; Rutjens, van Harreveld, van 
Elk, van der Pligt, & Pyszczynski, 2016). As such, we expect religious orthodoxy in particular to 
be a strong predictor of general faith in science.  
As a final addition, we included a behavioral measure of the willingness to support and 
prioritize science. We devised a resource allocation task for this purpose, in which participants 
could indicate their preference with regard to the distribution of federal spending budget, based 
on a ‘discretionary spending pie’. Science was one of the twelve spending areas for participants 
to take into consideration.  
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Participants. A total of 203 MTurk workers participated in exchange for a monetary 
reward. Seventeen participants did not complete more than half of the study, and another 13 
failed an attention check. They were excluded from analyses. The remaining 173 participants (70 
women) had a mean age of 37.43 (SD = 11.76).  
Procedure and materials. The study consisted of the following measures (see also 
Appendix A), and unless reported otherwise, all items were scored on 7-point scales ranging 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree): 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire. Participants completed the moral judgments section 
of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ30-2; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). This 
questionnaire consists of 16 items of which 15 cover the 5 moral foundations of care/harm, 
fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and purity/degradation, and one was a 
control item. All items were scored on 5-point scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree). 
Rejection of science findings. We asked participants to respond to the same four items 
regarding HIV, smoking, climate change, and vaccinations as we used in the pilot study.  
Faith in Science. Participants completed a 5-item Faith in Science scale (Farias et al., 
2013; Hayes et al., 2000). An example item is “Science is the most efficient means of attaining 
truth” Į = .92).  
Religion, political ideology, demographic variables. Participants were asked to indicate 
their gender, age, nationality, religious identity, religious affiliation, belief in God, and political 
orientation. In addition to the political conservatism slider item (see pilot study) we added two 
similar items asking for participants’ political outlook regarding social issues and economic 
issues separately (see Talhelm et al., 2015). Next, participants completed the orthodoxy subscale 
of the Postcritical Belief Scale (Fontaine et al., 2003), in which we embedded an attention check 
(Oppenheimer et al., 2012). Example items are “You can only live a meaningful life if you 
believe” and “I think that Bible stories should be taken literally, as they are written” (Į = .93). 
Science support. Finally, a pie chart was presented to participants (see Appendix D), with 
the accompanying instructions: “Below, you can view the 'Discretionary Spending Pie' for the 
US in 2015. In the next and final part of the study, it is your job to rearrange the percentages to 




order of spending budget. It is up to you to indicate changes to the spending pie, by rearranging 
the order of areas. Which spending areas should be prioritized in 2016? You can drag and drop 
the different items to rearrange the order. (If you are fine with the current order, you can leave it 
exactly like this.)”. Participants could rearrange the 12 spending areas to reflect their preferred 
order of prioritization. We looked at where participants placed science, which translated to a 
score on an interval scale ranging from 1 (highest funding allocation) to 12 (lowest funding 
allocation).   
Results 
 Correlations. Table 2 provides an overview of focal zero-order correlations.  
Predictors of science rejection and faith in science. We used hierarchical regression 
analyses in order to assess which variables best predict faith in science, science skepticism, and 
science support. We included general demographic variables and added the moral foundations in 
Model 1, political conservatism in Model 28, religious identity and orthodoxy in Model 3, and 
faith in science in Model 4 (except in the regression analysis of faith in science). The final model 
of each set of analyses, depicting the key predictors, is presented in Table 3 (for the complete 
regression tables, see Appendix C, Tables C1-4).  
Faith in Science. We started with assessing whether faith in science is predicted by the 
demographic variables we included in the study. Age and gender alone already explained 10% of 
the variance, p < .001. Men reported more faith in science than women, which also slightly 
decreased with age (see Appendix C, Table C-1). This gender effect disappeared when 
controlling for the ideological variables entered next. In Model 2, adding the moral foundations 
increased explained variance to 22%, p < .001. The only moral foundations predictor was moral 
purity concerns, which negatively predicted faith in science, Beta = -.41. In Model 3, we added 
political conservatism, which increased the variance explained to 26%, p < .001. Adding religion 
(religious identity and orthodoxy) in Model 4 however strongly increased explained variance to 
42%, F(10, 171) = 13.55, p < .001. Religious orthodoxy was the strongest negative predictor of 
faith in science, Beta = -.43, p < .001, 95% CI [-0.62, -0.25].  
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 HIV and smoking. Skepticism about the link between HIV and AIDS and between 
smoking and lung cancer was not associated with any of the variables included in the study, 
except conservatism about social issues (r = .19 and .17, respectively; ps  < .05). Dismissing the 
smoking-lung cancer link also weakly correlated with faith in science, r = -.17, p  = .0279.  
Climate change. Model 2 (moral foundations) was not significant, although concerns 
about harm/care and purity were significant predictors (see Appendix C, Table C-2). Adding 
political conservatism in Model 3 however increased explained variance to 10%, with 
conservatism being a significant predictor of climate change rejection (Beta = .24, p < .01, 95% 
CI [0.03, 0.01]) and rendering moral concerns no longer significant. Adding religiosity did not 
further contribute to the explained variance. However, faith in science accounted for an 
additional 6% of the variance; Model 5 best predicted rejection of anthropogenic climate change, 
F(11, 171) = 3.95, p < .001. Importantly, while faith in science contributed unique explained 
variance, adding it to the analyses did not meaningfully reduce the effect of political 
conservatism (see Appendix C, Table C-2).  
Vaccinations. As in the pilot study, vaccine skepticism again yielded a different pattern 
of results than was the case for climate change skepticism. Here, purity concerns accounted for 
11% of the variance, Beta = .27. Political conservatism did not contribute, but religious identity 
and orthodoxy did, accounting for an additional 2.4% of the variance in Model 4. Faith in 
science accounted for another 2.1% of the variance in Model 5, F(11, 171) = 3.86, p <.001. In 
this model, religious identity was the strongest predictor of vaccine skepticism (next to purity 
concerns and faith in science). Importantly, the effect of religious orthodoxy was no longer 
significant when faith in science was added (see Appendix C, Table C-3). This suggests that 
while self-identified religious people in general have a problem with vaccines that cannot be 
attributed to a broader lack of faith in science, religious conservatives in particular are possibly 
skeptical about vaccines because of a broader distrust in science. A bootstrapping analysis 
(model 4 of Process macro; Preacher & Hayes, 2004) of 5,000 samples indeed confirmed 
mediation of orthodoxy by faith in science, with an indirect effect of .13 (SE = .06) with a 95% 
CI of [.26 to .02], see Figure 2. 
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 Science support. The mean ranking of science on the resource allocation task was around 
the midpoint of the measure (which ranged from 1 to 12): 6.83 (SD = 2.87). Also, science 
funding allocation correlated with moral purity concerns, faith in science, political conservatism, 
and religion. When entering only demographic variables in the hierarchical regression analysis, 
gender was a significant predictor of allocation, explained 13.7% of the variance. Adding the 
moral foundations in Model 2 increased explained variance to 20.5%, with purity concerns being 
the only moral foundation that predicted allocation, Beta = .25, p < .01, 95% CI [0.19, 1.18]. 
Adding political conservatism did not increase explained variance, but adding religious 
orthodoxy in Model 4 did. Faith in Science (Model 5) did not further increase explained 
variance. Thus, the model that explained most of the variance (22%) was Model 4, F(10, 171) = 
13.55, p < .001 (see Table 3 and Appendix C, Table C-4). Controlling for all other variables, 
gender and religious orthodoxy were the only significant predictors of science funding 
allocation10.  
Discussion 
Study 1 replicated and extended the results of the pilot study. First, we again observed that HIV-
AIDS and smoking-cancer rejection are not ideologically fueled. Then, we replicate the finding 
that climate change skepticism is best predicted by political conservatism. Although faith in 
science also contributed, it did not meaningfully reduce the effect of political conservatism. This 
suggests that political conservatives’ skepticism about climate change is not due to a more 
general distrust in science. Also consistent with the pilot study results, vaccine skepticism was 
best predicted by religious identity, moral purity concerns and faith in science. Although 
religious participants were skeptical about vaccines, we also observed that the effect of religious 
orthodoxy specifically was reduced when including faith in science. This suggests that religious 
people are skeptical about vaccines, and that the more (religiously) conservative among them are 
skeptical because they maintain a low faith in science, which is indeed what we observed in the 
mediation analysis. Finally, whereas political conservatism was a weak predictor of vaccine 
skepticism in the pilot study, it was unrelated to vaccine skepticism in the current study. 
Religious conservatives in particular have a low faith in science (see the beta weights in left 
column of Table 3): Orthodoxy was found to be the strongest negative predictor of faith in 
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science, over and beyond political conservatism. In line with this, religious orthodoxy also was 
the strongest predictor of reduced willingness to support science; the higher participants scored 
on the orthodoxy measure, the lower they ranked science on the resource allocation task. As was 
the case with faith in science, the initial contribution of moral purity concerns was reduced when 
adding orthodoxy, and political conservatism did not contribute any meaningful variance11.  
 In sum, Study 1 showed that political conservatism was the best ideological predictor of 
climate change skepticism, while religious identity was the best ideological predictor of vaccine 
skepticism. General lack of faith in science—which in turn resulted in vaccine skepticism—and 
the (un)willingness to support science were best predicted by religious conservatism.  
Study 2 
 Having established that different forms of science acceptance and rejection have different 
antecedents, we next sought to test whether this pattern of results generalizes beyond the MTurk 
population. To do so, we used data from the 2010 wave of the ISSP (Environment III) conducted 
in the US (ISSP Research Group, 2012) in order to conceptually replicate the results obtained 
thus far by using a representative sample of the US population. We identified measures of 
climate change skepticism, faith in science, as well as political conservatism and religiosity. 
Additionally, the dataset contained a GM food skepticism measure. There were no items on 
vaccine skepticism, morality, and scientific literacy.    
Method 
 We downloaded the dataset of the ZA5500: International Social Survey Programme: 
Environment III - ISSP 2010 at 
https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/sdesc2.asp?ll=10%C2%ACabs=&af=&nf=&search=&search2=
&db=e&no=5500. The US data (N = 1430; Mage = 48.08, SDage = 17.81; 823 women) was 
collected early 2010 by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC – General Social Survey). 
There were no data exclusions12. The following variables were identified as relevant to the 
purpose of the current research: 
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However, it is important to note that female participants were more orthodox in this sample, and that orthodoxy 
actually explained this difference.  
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 Science skepticism. Two items were identified as proxies of climate change and GM food 
skepticism, respectively: “In general, do you think that a rise in the world's temperature caused 
by climate change is…” and “And do you think that modifying the genes of certain crops is…”. 
Both items had an answer scale ranging from 1 (extremely dangerous for the environment) to 5 
(not dangerous at all for the environment), and including a “can’t choose” option. Responses to 
the GM food item were reverse-scored as to signal skepticism.   
 Faith in science. Two items (r = .37) in the dataset were identified as measuring faith in 
science: “We believe too often in science, and not enough in feelings and faith” and “Overall, 
modern science does more harm than good”. Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement 
on a scale ranging from 1 (agree strongly) to 5 (disagree strongly). There was also a “can’t 
choose” option.        
 Religion, political ideology, demographic variables. In addition to respondents’ age and 
gender, political preference was measured on a 5-point scale consisting of the following response 
options: 1 (far left.); 2 (left/center left); 3 (center/liberal); 4 (right/conservative); 5 (far right). 500 
respondents identified as left/center left, 561 as center/liberal, and 322 as right/conservative. 35 
respondents ticked other/no specification. Religious denomination was measured (including “no 
religion”). As no measure of religious orthodoxy was included, we looked at frequency of 
religious service attendance as a proxy. Attendance frequency was measured with the item “How 
often do you attend religious services”, with the following response options: 1 (several times a 
week or more); 2 (once a week); 3 (2 or 3 times a month); 4 (once a month); 5 (several times a 
year); 6 (once a year); 7 (less frequently then once a year); 8 (never). Mean response was 4.67 
(SD = 2.46).  
Results 
 Zero-order correlations can be found in Table 4. As in Study 1, we used hierarchical 
regression analyses in order to assess which variables best predict faith in science and science 
skepticism. We included general demographic variables and added political ideology in Model 2, 
religious denomination (dichotomized to no religion vs. religion) and religious attendance in 
Model 3, and faith in science in Model 4 (except in the regression analysis of faith in science) 
which is depicted in Table 5 (see Appendix C, Tables C5-7 for the complete regression analysis). 
 Climate change. Model 3 explained 9.2% of the variance, F(3, 1297) = 44.80, p < .001. 




Beta = .27, p < .001, 95% CI [0.28, 0.42].  Adding religious denomination, religious attendance 
frequency and faith in science did not lead to meaningful increases in explained variance.  
 GM food. Model 4 explained 6.6% of the variance, F(6, 1162) = 14.70, p < .001. Political 
conservatism weakly contributed to the explained variance (with conservatives being slightly 
less skeptical), while religious denomination and religious attendance frequency did not predict 
GM food skepticism. Faith in science (alongside small effects of gender and age) was a 
significant predictor, Beta = -.19, p < .001, 95% CI [-0.15, -0.29]. 
 Faith in science. Model 3 explained 9.6% of the variance, F(5, 1383) = 30.23, p < .001 . 
As can be seen in Table 5, the only significant predictors (alongside small effects of gender and 
age) were religious denomination (Beta = -.16, p < .001, 95% CI [-0.50, -0.24]) and religious 
attendance frequency, Beta = .19, p < .001, 95% CI [0.05, 0.09] (note that lower scores indicate 
higher attendance rates).   
Discussion   
 Although the ISSP dataset did not include all measures of interest to the current project, 
with the data available we were able to conceptually replicate the findings of Study 1 among a 
large, representative, sample of the US general population. Again, climate change skepticism 
was found to be primarily political, with religiosity playing no meaningful role. Moreover, faith 
in science was best predicted by religious orthodoxy, using a measure gauging frequency of 
religious attendance. Finally, we also found that GM food skepticism was best predicted by faith 
in science, and not religious or political ideology (political conservatism had a small negative 
effect).   
Study 3 
A final study sought to integrate and extend the first two studies. The design was similar 
to that of Study 1, with the following changes: First, along the faith in science measure we also 
reintroduced the scientific literacy test from the pilot study. This way, we were able to directly 
distinguish lack of science literacy (knowledge) from lack of science trust (faith) in predicting 
science skepticism and support. Second, we replaced the single-item skepticism items used so far 
with more elaborate scales, targeting skepticism of climate change, vaccines, and GM food.  
Method 
Participants. A total of 194 MTurk workers participated in exchange for a monetary 




not complete the study. These participants were excluded from analyses. The remaining 167 
participants (73 women) had a mean age of 35.80 (SD = 10.67).  
Procedure and materials. The study consisted of the following measures (also see 
Appendix A):  
Moral Foundations Questionnaire. Participants completed the moral judgments section 
of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ30-2; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009), identical to 
Study 1.  
Scientific literacy. Participants then continued with same scientific literacy test as used in 
the pilot study (with a maximum score of 9; Į = .59; Kahan et al., 2012).  
Science skepticism. Next, we presented participants with three science rejection scales 
(Lewandowsky et al., 2013b), each consisting of five items: Climate change skepticism (e.g., “I 
believe that the climate is always changing and what we are currently observing is just natural 
fluctuation”; Į = .88); Vaccination skepticism (e.g., “The risk of vaccinations to maim and kill 
children outweighs their health benefits”; Į = .88) and GM food skepticism (e.g., “I believe that 
because there are so many unknowns, it is dangerous to manipulate the natural genetic material 
of foods”; Į = .91). All items were scored on 7-point scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 
7 (strongly agree). 
Faith in Science. Participants completed the 5-item Faith in Science scale (Farias et al., 
2013; Hayes et al., 2000) as in Study 1 (Į = .91). The order of presentation of the rejection of 
science findings and Faith in Science scale was counterbalanced.  
Religion, political ideology, demographic variables. As in Study 1, participants were 
asked to indicate their gender, age, nationality, religious identity, religious affiliation, belief in 
God, and political conservatism. They also completed the orthodoxy subscale of the Postcritical 
Belief Scale again (Į = .94), in which we embedded an attention check. 
 Science support. Finally, the same13 resource allocation task as employed in Study 1 was 
presented. Again, participants were asked to rearrange 12 spending areas to reflect their preferred 
order of prioritization, with science being our target area of interest (ranking range from 1 to 12).  
Results 
 Correlations. Table 6 provides an overview of correlations.  
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Hierarchical regression analyses. We again used hierarchical regression analyses in 
order to assess which variables best predict our variables of interest. In the current study, we 
investigated climate change skepticism, vaccination skepticism, GM food skepticism, scientific 
literacy, faith in science, and resource allocation to science. In addition to demographics, moral 
foundations were included in Model 2, political conservatism in Model 3, religious identity and 
orthodoxy in Model 4, and faith in science and scientific literacy in Model 5 (which only applied 
to analyses on  skepticism and science support); see Table 7 (and Appendix C, Tables C8-13).  
Scientific literacy. Model 4 explained the most variance, F(10, 166) = 6.44, p < .001, 
with religious orthodoxy (alongside age) as the only significant predictor of literacy, Beta = -.36, 
p < .001, 95% CI [-0.56, -0.15]. Although faith in science correlated with literacy, it did not 
contribute unique explained variance.  
Science skepticism. Results show that political conservatism is again the strongest 
predictor of climate change skepticism; Model 3, F(10, 166) = 10.63, p < .001. Faith in science 
did not explain additional variance. In contrast to Studies 1-2, religious identity, orthodoxy, and 
moral purity explained additional variance over and beyond political ideology.  
Mirroring the results of Study 1, vaccination skepticism was best predicted by moral 
purity concerns, religious identity, and faith in science, while political conservatism again played 
no additional role (Model 5, F(12, 166) = 3.46, p < .001). Importantly, we again found that the 
effect of religious conservatism (i.e., orthodoxy) on vaccine skepticism was mediated by low 
faith in science. A bootstrapping analysis of 5,000 samples (Process macro 4; Hayes, 2014) 
indeed confirmed mediation of orthodoxy by faith in science, with an indirect effect of .12 (SE = 
.08) with a 95% CI of [.01 to .24]; see Figure 3. Finally, as in the pilot study, scientific literacy 
also helped predict vaccine skepticism. 
GM food skepticism, in turn, was not predicted by religious and political ideology, but 
primarily by faith in science (in addition to scientific literacy, and gender, see Appendix C, Table 
C-12). Moral purity concerns played a marginal role; Model 5, F(12, 166) = 4.24, p < .001. Thus, 
faith in science and the scientific method, as well as—to a lesser extent—scientific literacy, was 
negatively related to GM food skepticism. Women were more skeptical of GM food than men14.  
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Faith in science. Model 4 explained the most variance, F(10, 166) = 16.18, p < .001, 
with religious orthodoxy again being the strongest predictor, Beta = -.32, p < .001, 95% CI [-
0.47, -0.14]. In contrast to Study 1, religious identity and political conservatism also contributed 
to the explained variance. Scientific literacy did not explain additional variance. 
Science support. In predicting the allocation of resources to science, Model 5 explained 
the highest proportion of variance, F(12, 166) = 7.27, p < .001. Religious orthodoxy was again a 
predictor of science support, albeit only marginally, and weaker as in Study 2 (Beta = .19, p = 
.095, 95% CI [-0.06, 0,71]). In addition, political conservatism (Beta = .21, p < .001, 95% CI 
[0.01, 0.04]) and faith in science (Beta = -.19, p = .04, 95% CI [-0.69, -0.01]) were significant 
predictors in this model, which we did not observe in Study 1. Also, gender was again a 
significant predictor, although gender and age alone explained less variance than in Study 1 
(3.8%). Contrary to Study 1, we also observed a role for moral concerns; fairness and authority 
negatively predicted science support (see Appendix C, Table C-13) 
Discussion 
The goal of Study 3 was to replicate and extend Studies 1 and 2, using more elaborate 
science skepticism measures. Moreover, Study 3 contained both measures of faith in science and 
scientific literacy with the goal to directly compare their impact on science skepticism. Results 
largely replicated our Study 1 and 2 findings. Again, climate change skepticism was best 
predicted by political conservatism, which was not due to a general distrust in science. However, 
in contract to Studies 1-2, religious identity and orthodoxy also had some predictive value. 
Vaccination skepticism was, again, predicted by purity concerns, religious identity and low faith 
in science. Similar to Study 1, we found that while religious participants were weary of vaccines 
in general, the orthodox among them seem to be particularly wary of vaccines because they 
distrust science in general. Scientific literacy also played a role; as in the pilot study, lower 
literacy was associated with more vaccination skepticism. Regarding GM food skepticism, we 
replicated the results obtained in Study 2: Low faith in science and low scientific literacy—
alongside gender—best predicted GM food skepticism. Religious and political conservatism 
played no meaningful role in predicting GM food skepticism, although we did find a marginal 
effect of religious identity.  
Religious orthodoxy was again the strongest predictor of faith in science; adding 




explained variance (~20%). This mirrors the results of Studies 1-2, and confirms the 
aforementioned notion that scientific explanations and religious explanations are perceived by 
many—particularly the orthodox—as competing explananda (e.g., Blancke et al., 2012; Farias, 
2013; Jensen, 1998; Jensen, 2009; Preston & Epley, 2008; Rutjens et al., 2016).  
Compared to the results of Study 1, a slightly different, more complex, picture emerged 
for the behavioral measure of science support. Rather than religious orthodoxy being the sole 
ideological predictor of reduced science support (see Study 1), the current study found that 
political conservatism and low faith in science also helped predict—to a similar extent—
decreased prioritization of science funding. In addition, we found that fairness and authority 
concerns also were associated with reduced science support. In other words, the more value was 
attached to bolstering authority and fairness, the lower science was ranked. Bivariate correlations 
show that all three binding moral foundations correlated positively with reduced science support, 
which is line with previous work on evaluations of scientists (Rutjens & Heine, 2016). When 
controlling for demographics and political and religious ideology however, fairness and authority 
concerns remain associated with science support. It is likely that respondents that score high on 
these measures are more inclined to prioritize other areas (e.g., social security, military) at the 
expense of science. 
The fact that, in contrast to the previous studies, both political conservatism and religious 
orthodoxy helped predict climate change skepticism and science support in this study could be 
the result of a temporal fusion of religious and political conservatism. Although a speculative 
point, the fact that this Study was ran on the day before the inauguration of Trump as president 
of the United States (while data for Studies 1 and 2 were collected early 2016 and 2010, 
respectively) might signal such a fusion of political ideology and religiosity, which has been 
argued to increase in times of political uncertainty (Shepherd, Eibach, & Kay, 2016).  
General Discussion 
Religion and science have repeatedly clashed in the course of modern history. It has been argued 
that attitudes towards science are becoming more polarized (e.g., Gauchat, 2012; Pittinsky, 2015; 
Rutjens et al., in press; see also Nature, 2017) and it is therefore important to gain more insight 
into the ideological predictors of modern science skepticism. Research investigating the 
antecedents of science skepticism indeed has made important strides in the last years (e.g., 




However, one construct that has been given surprisingly limited attention in these endeavors is 
religiosity. The current work aimed to address this lacuna by systematically scrutinizing 
religiosity alongside political ideology and morality, while controlling for faith in science and 
science understanding (i.e., literacy). By simultaneously including the aforementioned constructs 
and employing various measures and operationalizations of belief in science and science 
skepticism across different topics, our aim was to shed light on the relative predictive value of 
political conservatism, religiosity, and morality. Taken together, our results suggest that—with 
the exception of climate change and GM food skepticism—religiosity plays a pivotal role in 
predicting science acceptance and rejection. Vaccine skepticism, general faith in science, and the 
willingness to support science were across studies best predicted by religiosity, over and beyond 
political ideology, moral concerns, and scientific literacy.  
 Besides identifying religious identity and religious orthodoxy as being reliably associated 
with science acceptance and rejection, these results point to the heterogeneous nature of science 
skepticism. Corroborating previous empirical work (e.g., Lewandowsky et al., 2013b) and a 
recent meta-analysis (Hornsey et al., 2016), climate change skepticism was consistently found to 
be best predicted by political ideology. Moreover, we also found that political conservatives’ 
particular skepticism about climate change could not be attributed to a more general distrust in 
science. Instead, it is perhaps more likely that our data reflects the argumentation that 
conservatives worry about the economic and political ramifications of climate science 
(Lewandowsy et al., 2013; 2016). In contrast, political conservatism did not affect vaccine 
skepticism: Here, moral purity concerns and religious identity were consistent predictors. 
Additionally, among the religious respondents, religious conservatives were found to be 
skeptical about vaccines because of a general distrust (i.e., lack of faith) in science. Faith in 
science may reflect a more existential worldview that is hard to reconcile with orthodoxy in 
particular (Evans, 2011; Farias et al., 2013; Rutjens et al., 2016). Indeed, the current results also 
revealed a relatively consistent pattern of religious orthodoxy as the main driver of low faith in 
science and the unwillingness to support science. In contrast, another contentious topic in the 
biomedical sciences was not found to be fueled by political or religious belief; GM food 
skepticism was best predicted by faith in science and knowledge about science. In other words, 
unlike climate change and vaccine skepticism, GM food skepticism is not driven by political or 




Another way of looking at the antecedents of science acceptance is to pit knowledge 
constraints (science literacy) against ideological constraints (religious and political 
convictions)15. Having the background to understand science may help predict overall science 
acceptance, while ideology differentially predicts acceptance of specific scientific findings. Our 
data offer insight into this possibility. Indeed, across studies we find that scientific literacy helps 
predict both vaccine and GM food skepticism, however this is not the case for climate science 
skepticism and general science support (see Figure 1). These findings help formulate 
recommendations to increase public acceptance of science. First, our findings suggest that in 
order to boost acceptance of GM food, it would help to improve public understanding of science. 
Second, this recommendation may to some extent hold for acceptance of childhood vaccination 
as well, although based on the predictive power of religiosity there is more to boosting vaccine 
acceptance than merely improving scientific literacy. In contrast, in order to combat climate 
science skepticism, enhancing literacy may not be very useful at all (and could even backfire; see 
Drummond & Fischhoff, in press). Finally, willingness to support science more generally also 
seems unlikely to increase as a result of merely enhancing public science understanding.    
The modest to absent role of political ideology in predicting vaccine and GM food 
skepticism mirrors earlier work (Kahan, 2015; Lewandowsky et al., 2013b; Scott et al., 2016), 
and the current research sheds light on which constructs are better suited to predict acceptance of 
these scientific findings. However, it also highlights the problem of the potentially confounded 
nature of three overlapping predictors: Political ideology, religiosity, and morality. As one 
example, a visual inspection of the zero-order correlations suggests a relation between political 
conservatism and vaccine skepticism in the pilot study and Study 1, but the results of Study 1 
show that adjusting for moral purity concerns alone is enough to nullify this correlation. In a 
similar vein, any ideological correlate with GM food skepticism observed in Study 3 disappeared 
once faith in science was controlled for. As another example, moral purity concerns correlate 
with all variables included in the correlation matrices in Studies 1 and 3, but the relative 
predictive value of moral purity is reduced once orthodoxy was controlled for. To distill these 
examples to one focal point; the zero-order correlations in these data do little to reveal the nature 
of science acceptance and rejection, since most variables intercorrelate yet crucially some 
predictors disappear when controlling for others. This corroborates our reasoning that it is 
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essential to include the full range of ideological, moral, and literacy measures and gauge their 
relative weight when investigating science skepticism.        
 It is important to note that the current work is correlational and we therefore have to be 
careful to infer causality. That said, it is unlikely that people become more religious or 
conservative as a result of skepticism about science. Our aim was to investigate how (relatively 
stable) ideological differences in religiosity and political orientation impact on science 
acceptance and rejection.  
 Another important consideration is that the current studies focused exclusively on 
samples of North-American participants. Studies 1 and 3 were conducted using North-American 
participants on MTurk, a pool of online workers that is not directly representative of any specific 
segment of any specific population, but is more diverse in terms of demographic background 
than—for example—the population of North-American undergraduate students (Mason & Suri, 
2012). Results of Study 2 however, which used data from a representative sample of the US 
population, increases confidence in the generalizability of our results to at least the population of 
US adults. It remains to be seen whether  the current results will generalize to other populations, 
for example secular European countries such as the Netherlands, France, or Denmark.  
To sum up the current findings, in four studies both political conservatism and religiosity 
independently predict science skepticism and rejection. Climate skepticism was consistently 
predicted by political conservatism, vaccine skepticism was consistently predicted by religiosity, 
and GM food skepticism was consistently predicted by low faith in science and knowledge of 
science. General low faith in science and unwillingness to support science in turn were primarily 
associated with religiosity, in particular religious conservatism. Thus, different forms of science 
acceptance and rejection have different ideological roots, although the case could be made that 
these are generally grounded in conservatism.  
Coda 
A recent editorial in the prestigious science journal Nature (2017) argued for a more nuanced 
view on modern anti-science sentiments, given that science is not a single entity that people are 
either for or against. Speaking to this view, the current paper extends the statement that “science 
does not speak with a single voice” (p. 134) to science skepticism, which—like science itself—is 
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Table 1. Overview of key variables 
Key predictors Additional measures Key dependent measures 
Political conservatism Demographics Climate change skepticism 
Religiosity Scientific literacy (Study 3) Vaccine skepticism  
Morality (Studies 1 & 3)  GM food skepticism (Studies 2-3) 
  Faith in science (Studies 1-3) 
  Science support (Studies 1 & 3) 
 
Table 2. Correlations between the moral purity foundation, climate change rejection and belief 
in vaccines-autism link, faith in science, resource allocation, and political and religious variables. 
Study 1.  
 M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 – MFQ: purity/degradation 3.00 (1.03) -         
2 – Climate change skepticism 2.35 (1.64) .22** -        
3 – Vaccine skepticism 2.10 (1.44) .35** .12 -       
4 – Faith in science 4.85 (1.55) -.42** -.35** -.30** -      
5 – Political conservatism 38.83 (27.57) .27** .27** .13 -.28** -     
6 – Conservatism: social issues 33.73 (26.77) .43** .31** .21** -.37** .87** -    
7 – Conservatism: economic issues 43.76 (29.21) .16* .24** .03 -.20** .89** .69** -   
8 – Belief in God 45.52 (41.61) .42** .09 .21** -.58** .24** .37** .14 -  
9 – Religious orthodoxy 2.57 (1.53) .49** .21** .26** -.61** .35** .47** .18* .12 - 
10 - Religious identity (1=no; 2=yes) 36% yes .37** .11 .09 -.53** .28** .40** .16* .77** .71** 
11 – Science funding allocation 6.83 (2.87) .37** .13 .26** -.31** .16* .22** .10 .36** .36** 
Note. *p <.05; **p < .01. Science funding allocation: Higher scores indicate a lower ranking of 





Table 3.Final models of hierarchical regression analyses of faith in science, climate change 
skepticism, vaccine skepticism, and science support, Study 1.  







 Adj. R2=.42** Adj. R2=.16** Adj. R2=.16** Adj. R2=.22** 
   Purity -.17* .11  .21*   .16 
  Conservatism -.05 .23*  .08   .04 
  Religious identity -.11  .18  .29**   .09 
  Religious orthodoxy -.43**  .00  .14  .21* 
  Faith in science  -.34** -.22* -.06  
Note. *p <.05; **p < .01. All analyses adjust for demographic variables and moral foundations 
scores. Science funding allocation: Higher scores indicate a lower ranking of science on the 
resource allocation task. 
 
Table 4. Correlations matrix, Study 2.  
 M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 – Climate change skepticism 2.20 (.90) -      
2 – GM skepticism 2.53 (1.08) -.30** -     
3 – Faith in science 3.09 (.92) -.08** -.19** -    
4 – Political conservatism 4.38 (2.06)  .27** -.10** -.01 -   
5 – Religious identity (1=no; 2=yes) 81.4%  yes  .12** -.01 -.24**  .05 -  







Table 5. Final models of hierarchical regression analyses of faith in science, climate change 
skepticism, and GM skepticism, Study 2.  
 Faith in science Climate change 
skepticism 
GM skepticism 
 Adj. R2=.10** Adj. R2=.10** Adj. R2=.07** 
Political conservatism -.01   .26** -.08** 
Religious denomination -.16**  .08* -.06 
Religious orthodoxy -.19**  .01 -.00 
Faith in science  -.06* -.19** 
Note. *p <.05; **p < .01. All analyses adjust for age and gender. Religious orthodoxy was 
measured with an item gauging religious attendance frequency.  
 
Table 6. Correlation matrix, Study 3.  
 M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 – MFQ: purity/degradation 3.15 (1.12) -         
2 – Climate change skepticism 2.89 (1.76)  .38** -        
3 – Vaccine skepticism 2.57 (1.48)  .25**  .41** -       
4 – GM skepticism 3.85 (1.61)  .20**  .23**  .58** -      
5 – Faith in science 4.58 (1.64)) -.40** -.40** -.30** -.35** -     
6 – Political conservatism 42.15 (31.29)  .36**  .49**  .11  .16* -.41** -    
7 –Belief in God 48.48 (43.07)  .56**  .29**  .17*  .21** -.66**  .34** -   
8 – Religious identity (1=no; 2=yes) 42.5% yes  .53**  .26**  .13  .12 -.60**  .30**  .80** -  
9 – Religious orthodoxy 2.95 (1.72)  .62**  .40**  .25**  .15 -.58**  .33**  .71**  .71** - 




11 – Science funding allocation 6.80 (3.04)  .32**  .28**   .13  .27**  -.43**  .37** .42**  .41**  .46**
Note. *p <.05; **p < .01. Science funding allocation: Higher scores indicate a lower ranking of 
science on the resource allocation task.  
 
Table 7. Final model of hierarchical regression analyses of scientific literacy, faith in science, 
















 Adj. R2=.25** Adj. R2=.48** Adj. R2=.37** Adj. R2=.15** Adj. R2=.19** Adj. R2=.31** 
  Purity  -.12  -.02 .24* .33**  .16   -.18 
  Conservatism  -.04  -.19** .27** -.06  .06   .21* 
  Religious identity  -.01  -.30** .21* .22*  .21^   .06 
  Religious orthodoxy  -.36**  -.32** .24* .12  -.12   .19^ 
  Faith in science   -.11 -.24*  -.38** -.19* 
 Scientific literacy   -.01 -.19*  -.18* -.06 
Note. ^p < .10; *p <.05; **p < .01. All analyses adjust for demographic variables and moral 
foundations scores. Scientific literacy did not contribute to the explained variance of faith in 
science and vice versa, thus for these variables the final model omitted from this table. Science 











             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
          
 
 
Figure 1. Overview of main findings across studies.  
Note. Dashed line indicates single observation in Study 3. All other relations are observed in > 1 
studies.  
             
             
             
             
             
             
             


























Figure 2. Mediation of religious orthodoxy on vaccine skepticism by faith in science, Study 1.  
*p < .05, **p < .01.  
 
 
Figure 3. Mediation of religious orthodoxy on vaccine skepticism by faith in science, Study 3.  



















APPENDIX A: Scales 
Scientific literacy items (Studies 1 and 3) 
All items answered true or false 
The center of the Earth is very hot. 
All radioactivity is made by humans. 
Lasers work by focusing sound waves. 
Electrons are smaller than atoms. 
It is the father's gene that decides whether the baby is a boy or a girl. 
Antibiotics kill viruses as well as bacteria. 
All human-made chemicals can cause cancer. 
Astrology has some scientific truth. 
Humans developed from animals. 
 
Science skepticism scales (Study 3) 
All items answered on scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) 
Climate: 
I believe that the climate is always changing and what we are currently observing is just natural 
fluctuation. 
I believe that most of the warming over the last 50 years is due to the increase in greenhouse gas 
concentrations. 





Human CO2 emissions cause climate change. 
Humans are too insignificant to have an appreciable impact on global temperature. 
GM food:  
I believe that genetic modification is an important and viable contribution to help feed the 
world’s rapidly growing population. 
I believe genetically engineered foods have already damaged the environment. 
The consequences of genetic modification have been tested exhaustively in the lab, and only 
foods that have been found safe will be made available to the public. 
I believe that because there are so many unknowns, that it is dangerous to manipulate the natural 
genetic material of foods. 
Genetic modification of foods is a safe and reliable technology. 
Vaccine: 
I believe that vaccines are a safe and reliable way to help avert the spread of preventable 
diseases. 
I believe that vaccines have negative side effects that outweigh the benefits of vaccination for 
children. 
Vaccines are thoroughly tested in the laboratory and wouldn't be made available to the public 
unless it was known that they are safe. 
The risk of vaccinations to maim and kill children outweighs their health benefits. 






APPENDIX B: Pilot study full results description and tables 
Predictors of scientific literacy. First, we assessed whether scientific literacy is predicted by the 
demographic and ideological variables we included in the study. To do so, we used a hierarchical 
regression analysis (see Table 3). First, we entered age, gender, and profession (academia or 
other). This model explained 4% of the variance, p = .051. Age and gender were associated with 
scientific literacy. Not surprisingly, literacy increased with age. Also, men scored marginally 
higher on the scientific literacy test than women. In Model 1, we added political conservatism, 
which increased the explained variance to 18%. Adding religious belief (religious identity and 
belief in God) helped to explain some additional variance, with belief in God being a marginally 
significant predictor of literacy. Thus, the strongest predictor of literacy was political 
conservatism; the more conservative, the lower participants scored on the scientific literacy test.    
Predictors of science rejection. Next, we used hierarchical regression analysis to assess which 
of the variables we included in the study best predict science rejection. To do so, we used the 
same hierarchical regression analysis as above for each of the four rejection items, but adding 
scientific literacy in a third model and stereotypes16 about scientists in model 4 (adding this 
measure did not explain any additional variance and is therefore omitted from Table 3, for 
presentation purposes).  
HIV and smoking. As can be inferred from the correlations displayed in Table 1, 
rejection of the HIV-AIDS and smoking-lung cancer link was not associated with any of the 
other variables included in the study, except scientific literacy. Indeed, none of the models tested 
explained a meaningful amount of the variance for these two items, and the only significant 
predictor for both items was scientific literacy.  
Climate change. In a hierarchical regression analysis (see Table 3), adding political 
conservatism to the demographics in Model 1 (age, gender, profession) increased explained 
variance from almost zero to 17%, with conservatism being a significant predictor, Beta = .44, p 
<.001, 95% CI [0.02, 0.04]. Religiosity did not explain additional variance (Model 2). The model 
that best predicted anthropogenic climate change skepticism was Model 3, which also included 
scientific literacy. This model explained 20% of the variance, F(6, 97) = 4.67, p < .001. Adding 
the stereotypes measures in a fourth model did not further increase explained variance.  
                                                          
16
 Note that we only include the explicit stereotypes scale in the regression analyses, because the intuitive measure 




Vaccinations. Predicting vaccination skepticism (i.e., belief that vaccines can cause 
autism) yielded a pattern of results different from that of predicting climate change skepticism. 
Again, as can be seen in Table 3, Model 3 explained the highest portion of variance; 47%, F(6, 
97) = 14.08, p < .001. However, here, religious belief, political conservatism, and scientific 
literacy all significantly explained parts of the variance, with the strongest predictor being 
scientific literacy, which accounted for an additional 24% of the explained variance in Model 3, 
Beta = -.55, p < .001, 95% CI [-0.58, -0.31]. 
Tables 
Table B-1. Correlation matrix, Pilot Study. 
 M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 – Rejection1: HIV  1.71 (1.25)  -          
2 – Rejection2: Smoking 1.58 (.99)  .30**  -       
3 – Rejection3: Climate change 2.24 (1.57)  .38**  .39**  -      
4 – Rejection4: Vaccinations 1.87 (1.39)  .16  .16 .38**  -     
5 – Intuitive moral stereotype 22.6% fallacy -.01 -.13 -.11  .00  -    
6 – Explicit moral stereotype 63.33(14.38)  .07  .14 .23*  .26* .10  -   
7 – Political conservatism  34.37(26.37)  .08  -.02  .41**  .41**  .08  .26**  -  
8 – Religious identity (1=no; 
2=yes) 
23% yes  .13 -.07  .15  .14  .09  .13 .36**  - 
9 – Belief in God 33.44 (39.92)  .10 -.02  .17  .35**  .12  .38** .38** .72*
10 – Scientific literacy 7.18 (1.70) -.32** -.20* -.37** -.64** -.14  -.21* -.32**  -.17 







Table B-2. Complete hierarchical regression analysis of scientific literacy, Pilot Study.  
*p <.05; **p < .01 
Step/Predictor Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
1. Age  .18  .23*  .24** 
   Gender (M=1; F=2) -.18 -.13 -.21* 
   Profession  .14  .14  .14 
2. Religious identity  -.04 -.09 
    Belief in God  -.32* -.22 
3. Political conservatism   -.33** 
    Adjusted R2  .04  .11**  .19** 
 
Table B-3. Complete hierarchical regression analysis of climate change skepticism, Pilot Study. 
*p <.05; **p < .01 
Step/Predictor Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 
1. Age  .03  .01  -.02  .04  .04 
   Gender  .09  .06  .16  .11  .11 
   Profession  .02  .02  .03 -.01  -.02 
2. Religious identity  -.07  .00  -.03 -.03 
    Belief in God  .12 -.02 -.08 -.08 
3. Political conservatism    .45**  .36**  .34** 




5. Stereotypes      .10 
    Adjusted R2  -.02  -.01  .15** .20** .20** 
 
Table B-4. Complete hierarchical regression analysis of vaccine skepticism, Pilot Study.  
*p <.05; **p < .01 
Step/Predictor Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 
1. Age  .01  -.04  -.05  .08  .08 
   Gender  .08   .01   .09  -.02 -.02 
   Profession  .10   .09   .09  .02  .02 
2. Religious identity   .25   .30*   .25*  .25* 
    Belief in God   .51**  .42**  .30**  .30** 
3. Political conservatism    .38**  .20*  .19* 
4. Scientific literacy    -.55** -.54** 
5. Stereotypes      .08 





APPENDIX C: Complete hierarchical regression tables, Studies 1-3 
Study 1 
Table C-1. Complete hierarchical regression analysis of faith in science, Study 1.  
*p <.05; **p < .01. 
Step/Predictor Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
1. Age  -.20** -.13 -.09 -.14* 
   Gender (M=1; F=2)  -.22** -.22** -.23** -.11 
2. Care   .14  .09  .07 
    Fairness   .04 -.01  .01 
    Loyalty  -.03 -.00  .04 
    Authority   .09  .16  .08 
     Purity  -.41**  -.35** -.17* 
3. Conservatism    -.25** -.05 
4. Religious identity    -.11 
    Religious orthodoxy    -.43** 
    Adjusted R2  .10**  .22**  .26**  .42** 
 
Table C-2. Complete hierarchical regression analysis of climate change skepticism, Study 1.  
*p <.05; **p < .01 
Step/Predictor Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 
1. Age   .13  .09   .05   .05  .08 




2. Care  -.20* -.15 -.16 -.14 
    Fairness  -.04 -.00  .02  .03 
    Loyalty   .11  .08  .07  .08 
    Authority  -.08 -.15 -.15 -.13 
    Purity   .23*  .18  .16  .11 
3. Conservatism      .24**  .24*  .23* 
4. Religious identity    .14  .18 
    Religious orthodoxy    .14  .00 
5. Faith in Science     -.34** 
    Adjusted R2  .00  .07  .10** .10**  .16** 
 
Table C-3. Complete hierarchical regression analysis of vaccine skepticism, Study 1.  
*p <.05; **p < .01 
Step/Predictor Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 
1. Age   .03 -.04 -.04 -.04 -.07 
   Gender   .14  .14  .14   .17*  .15 
2. Care  -.05 -.04 -.06 -.05 
    Fairness   .03  .05  .07  .08 
    Loyalty   .16  .15  .13  .14 
    Authority  -.02 -.04 -.05 -.03 




3. Conservatism      .08  .09  .08 
4. Religious identity     .26*  .29** 
   Religious orthodoxy     .23*  .14 
5. Faith in Science     -.22* 
    Adjusted R2  .01 .11**  .11** .13**  .16** 
 
Table C-4. Complete hierarchical regression analysis of science spending on the resource 
allocation task, Study 1.  
Step/Predictor Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 
1. Age  .09  .04  .02  .04  .03 
   Gender (M=1; F=2)  .35**  .30** .30** .28**  .27** 
2. Care     .00  .02  .01  .02 
    Fairness   .02 .04  .05  .05 
    Loyalty   .00 -.02  -.04  -.04 
    Authority   .09  .07  .09  .09 
     Purity   .25**  .23*  .17  .16 
3. Conservatism     .10  .04  .04 
4. Religious identity     .08  .09 
    Religious orthodoxy     .24*  .21* 




    Adjusted R2 .14**  .21**  .21**  .22** .22** 




Table C-5. Complete hierarchical regression analysis of faith in science, Study 2.  
*p <.05; **p < .01 
Step/Predictor Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
1. Age  .00  .00  .05* 
   Gender -10** -.11** -.08** 
2. Conservatism  -.03 -.01 
3. Religious identity   -.16**  
    Religious orthodoxy   -.19** 
    Adjusted R2  .01** .01** .10** 
 
Table C-6. Complete hierarchical regression analysis of climate change skepticism, Study 2.  
*p <.05; **p < .01 
Step/Predictor Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
1. Age  .14**  .14**  .12**  .13** 
   Gender -.07* -.03 -.04 -.04 
2. Conservatism   .27**  .26**  .26** 
3. Religious identity    .08**   .08* 
    Religious orthodoxy   -.02 -.01 




    Adjusted R2  .02** .09** .10** .10** 
 
 
Table C-7. Complete hierarchical regression analysis of GM food skepticism, Study 2.  
*p <.05; **p < .01 
Step/Predictor Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
1. Age -.08** -.08** -.08** -.07* 
   Gender  .16**  .15**  .15**  .14** 
2. Conservatism  -.08** -.08** -.08** 
3. Religious identity   -.03  -.06 
    Religious orthodoxy   -.03  .00 
4. Faith in Science     -.19** 







Table C-8. Complete hierarchical regression analysis of scientific literacy, Study 3.  
^p < .10; *p <.05; **p < .01. 
Step/Predictor Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 
1. Age  .25**  .26**  .27**  .24** .24** 
   Gender -.21** -.19* -.19* -.14^ -.14^ 
2. Care   .04   .03  .04  .04 
    Fairness  -.06 -.08 -.10 -.10 
    Loyalty  -.06 -.05 -.04 -.04 
    Authority  -.04 -.03  .01  .01 
    Purity  -.31** -.30** -.12 -.12 
3. Conservatism   -.06 -.04 -.04 
4. Religious identity     -.01 -.01 
    Religious orthodoxy    -.36**  -.36** 
5. Faith in Science     -.02 
    Adjusted R2  .07**  .19**  .18**  .25**  .24** 
 
Table C-9. Complete hierarchical regression analysis of faith in science, Study 3.  
*p <.05; **p < .01. 
Step/Predictor Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 
1. Age -.21** -.21** -.19** -.20** -.20** 
   Gender -.15 -.12 -.12 -.05 -.05 




    Fairness   .24**  .17*  .12  .12 
    Loyalty  -.04 -.02 -.01 -.01 
    Authority  -.07 -.01  .06  .06 
    Purity  -.37** -.30** -.02 -.02 
3. Conservatism   -.24** -.19** -.19** 
4. Religious identity    -.30** -.30** 
    Religious orthodoxy    -.32** -.32** 
5. Scientific literacy     -.01 
    Adjusted R2  .07**  .25**  .29**  .48**  .47** 
 
Table C-10. Complete hierarchical regression analysis of climate change skepticism, Study 3.  
*p <.05; **p < .01. 
Step/Predictor Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 
1. Age  .06  .05  .03  .06  .04   
   Gender  .11  .08  .09  .07  .07 
2. Care   .08  .10  .12  .12 
    Fairness  -.42**  -.34** -.33** -.32** 
    Loyalty  -.08 -.10 -.11 -.11  
    Authority   .17  .11  .09  .09 
    Purity   .39**  .31**  .24*  .24* 
3. Conservatism    .29**  .29**  .27** 




    Religious orthodoxy     .27**  .24* 
5. Faith in science     -.11 
    Scientific literacy     -.01 
    Adjusted R2  .01  .28**  .34**  .37**  .37** 
 
Table C-11. Complete hierarchical regression analysis of vaccine skepticism, Study 3.  
*p <.05; **p < .01. 
Step/Predictor Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 
1. Age  .12  .13  .13  .16  .15 
   Gender  .06  .04  .04  .02 -.02 
2. Care  -.03 -.03 -.02 -.01 
    Fairness  -.18* -.18* -.18* -.17 
    Loyalty  -.12 -.12 -.13 -.14 
    Authority  -.13 -.13 -.14 -.13 
    Purity   .43**   .43**  .36**  .33** 
3. Conservatism   -.01 -.01 -.06  
4. Religious identity     .15  .22* 
    Religious orthodoxy     .26*  .12 
5. Faith in Science     -.24* 
    Scientific literacy     -.19* 






Table C-12. Complete hierarchical regression analysis of GM food skepticism, Study 3.  
^p < .10; *p <.05; **p < .01. 
Step/Predictor Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 
1. Age  .16*  .15  .14  .15  .12 
   Gender  .24**  .22**  .22**  .22**  .18* 
2. Care   .04  .05  .06  .08 
    Fairness  -.03  .00  .00  .03 
    Loyalty  -.09 -.10 -.10 -.11  
    Authority  -.01 -.04 -.04 -.01 
    Purity   .22*  .19^  .19^  .16 
3. Conservatism    .13  .14  .06 
4. Religious identity     .10  .21^ 
    Religious orthodoxy     .07  -.12 
5. Faith in Science     -.38** 
    Scientific literacy     -.18* 
    Adjusted R2 .09**  .10**  .11**  .10**  .19** 
 
Table C-13. Complete hierarchical regression analysis of science spending on the resource 
allocation task, Study 3.  
^p < .10; *p <.05; **p < .01. 
Step/Predictor Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 
1. Age -.00 -.03  -.05 -.04 -.06  
   Gender  .22**  .21**  .22**   .17*  .15* 




    Fairness   .05  .13  .16*  .18* 
    Loyalty   .08  .06  .05  .04 
    Authority   .30**  .23*  .20*  .21* 
    Purity   .08   .01 -.17 -.18 
3. Conservatism    .28**  .25**  .21* 
4. Religious identity     .11  .06 
    Religious orthodoxy     .26*  .19^ 
5. Faith in Science     -.19* 
    Scientific literacy     -.06 
    Adjusted R2  .04*  .18**  .24**  .30**  .31** 





APPENDIX D: Spending pie graphic used in Studies 1 and 3 
 
 
Note. Spending pie chart presented to participants in Study 1. Study 3 used the same measure, 
modified to represent the year 2016.   
 
